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Zimmerman: Fitting Publicity Rights into Intellectual Property and Free Spee

FITTING PUBLICITY RIGHTS INTO
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY AND FREE
SPEECH THEORY: SAM, YOU MADE TILE
PANTS TOO LONG!
Diane Leenheer Zimmerman l
It is particularly fitting that a session of the Intellectual Property
Section of the American Association of Law Schools on the right
of publicity is the way his colleagues have chosen to honor Ralph
Sharp Brown. Ralph Brown devoted much of his rich and varied
professional and academic life to the two areas that come together
in this discussion: intellectual property and freedom of speech.
Most of you know him as a copyright scholar, but he was also a
civil libertarian of great distinction who produced a body of
important scholarship on the use of loyalty oaths and on issues of
academic freedom and someone who gave generously of his time
and considerable lawyerly skills to further the cause of protecting
individual rights. I was actually introduced to him before I became
deeply involved in teaching copyright law by a mutual
acquaintance who served with Ralph as a member of the Board of
the American Civil Liberties Union and who thought that we
would enjoy sharing our deep interest in First Amendment issues.
For many years, Ralph taught a well-regarded First Amendment
seminar at Yale and at New York Law School on privacy, publicity
and libel law.
It was clearly no accident, therefore, that when he was invited to
give the Sixteenth Annual Donald C. Brace copyright lecture in
1986, he looked for a topic that reached beyond the confines of
statutory copyright. Rather, he chose to address what he termed, in
1 Professor of Law, New York University. I would like to offer special
thanks to Professors Roberta Kwall and Marci Hamilton for their very
perceptive and helpful comments on the draft of this paper. I hope I have
learned from them, and that they will forgive me for what I have failed to learn.
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his usual plainspoken and direct way, copyright's "upstart
cousins," within which he included the right of publicity.'
Although he was careful to point out that he did not defend
"spurious endorsements," 3 Ralph was not in other regards a great
fan of publicity rights - any more than he was to become an
admirer in later years of the trend toward ever-greater expansion of
copyrights. In his lecture, he focused in particular on a variety of
applications of the publicity right in areas other than commercial
advertising. He wrote that:
I continue to have trouble with the notion
that if I sculpt a bust of Martin Luther King, dead or
alive, I cannot sell copies of it, even when I make
no false claim that it is sponsored by Dr. King or the
Foundation that honors his memory. Similarly, I
have trouble with the notion that I cannot recreate
the Marx Brothers in my own blend of their style of
comedy and that of Chekhov. I have even more
trouble with the notion that I cannot do an Elvis
2 Ralph S. Brown, Copyright and Its Upstart Cousins: Privacy, Publicity,
Unfair Competition: The Sixteenth Donald C. Brace Memorial Lecture, 33 .
Copyrt. Soc. 301 (1986)[hereinafter Brown, Upstart Cousins]. The right of
publicity, like appropriation (its close kin in privacy law), prohibits commercial
uses of a variety of elements of identity without prior permission. Publicity
rights in personas differ from privacy rights in personas because publicity rights
are property rather than personal interests. Publicity rights can be sold, and in
many jurisdictions survive beyond the lifetime of the creator.
3 Id. at 304. The earliest cases involving commercial uses of identity were
ones in which defendants used the name or face of a private person, who did not
seek celebrity, in their advertising or product promotions. See Roberson v.
Rochester Folding Box Co., 171 N.Y. 538, 64 N.E. 442 (N.Y. 1902) (plaintiff's
face used on packages of flour). The first state to recognize a privacy right in
such cases was Georgia. The case involved a "spurious endorsement" in that the
insurance company made up a testimonial and attributed it to the plaintiff.
Pavesich v. New England Life Ins. Co., 50 S.E. 68 (Ga. 1905). Roberson, in
contrast, simply used the plaintiffs face as an attractive illustration on the
packaging. Whether or not this constituted a "spurious endorsement" is not
quite so clear. Nevertheless, to the extent that publicity cases are about
problems of falsification in advertising, rectification does not require a property
right in personality that is both alienable and descendible.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/5
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Presley act without coming to terms with a
corporate licensing enterprise.4
Although there is much to be said about the problems publicity
rights cause even in the area of advertising, 5 I would like to take
my lead in this discussion from Ralph and focus, as he did, on socalled commercial uses that are not designed solely to encourage
others to buy products or services.
In addition to selling
commemorative busts of famous people6 or imitating their
performances (the examples Ralph gave), this category includes a
diverse set of practices, including using well-known names and
faces (or, in some jurisdictions, using fictional characters
associated with particular actors) on clothes, trading cards, posters
and buttons - or even using celebrities to illustrate some forms of
editorial content in a magazine or newspaper.
Ralph identified a set of specific failings of the right of publicity
as applied to such activities that, in his view, undercut its
4 Brown, Upstart Cousins,supranote 2, at 305
5 1 have addressed this subject in detail in a previous article. Diane Leenheer
Zimmerman, Who Put the Right in the Right of Publicity?, 1998 Symposium on
Privacy and Publicity in a Modern Age: A Cross-Media Analysis of the First
Amendment. 9 DEPAUL J. ART & ENT. LAW 35 (1998) [hereinafter Zimmerman,
Publicity].
6 I speak here of famous people or celebrities, but in literal fact, in many, if
not most, jurisdictions today, anyone could claim a right of publicity if her
identity were used in a "commercial" way. See Martin Luther King, Jr. Center
for Social Change, Inc. v. American Heritage Products, Inc., 296 S.E.2d 697,
703 (Ga. 1982) (person need not be a celebrity to enjoy a right of publicity);
IND. CODE ANN. § 32-13-1-6 (Michie 1995) (if personal attributes have
commercial value for any reason, right of publicity applies). In California, for
example, if a person did not exploit her persona commercially during her
lifetime, the possibility of doing so for seven decades after her death can be
preserved by the executor or administrator of her estate by registering with the
Secretary of State and paying a $10 fee. CAL. CIv. CODE § 3344.1 (Deering
2000). The provision does not require that the deceased have been famous. The
so-called appropriation right, a branch of privacy law, has never required that
the plaintiff be famous. It can be used as an alternative cause of action by living
persons complaining of non-advertising uses. See, e.g., Mendonsa v. Time, Inc.,
678 F. Supp. 967 (D. R.I. 1988) (finding that sale of photograph, showing a
sailor - ostensibly the plaintiff - kissing a woman in Times Square at the end of
War Commons@DePaul,
II was a commercial 2016
use in violation of applicable privacy laws).
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legitimacy and made it a poor fit into any properly ordered body of
intellectual property law. He worried that the right of publicity
was "extending its reach into the preserve of ideas," 7 which ought
to remain part of the public domain. He raised a metaphoric
eyebrow at some of the justifications offered for the breadth of the
interest, and he complained that it lacked theoretically appropriate
boundaries. In his view, certain standards set for copyright (but
missing from publicity rights law) provided essential checks and
balances, and needed to be present in any property right involving
expressive matter.
The three requirements he identified were respect for the
idea/expression dichotomy, firm limits on duration, and the
existence of a generous privilege of fair use. Unfortunately, in the
decade and a half since Ralph's thoughtful Brace Lecture, the fit of
right of publicity into the intellectual property "suit" has not
improved.8 If anything, mis-sizing is even more acute today than
when he first called our attention to it. The idea/expression divide
has been ever more hopelessly muddled as the breadth of attributes
protected by publicity rights has grown in many states to a point
one might be tempted to describe as metaphysical.9 No longer are
7 Brown, UpstartCousins, supra note 2, at 304.
8 Several more recent critics have pointed out in greater detail a myriad of
problems with publicity rights and their steady expansion. See, e.g., Rosemary
J. Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity: Publicity Rights, Postmodern Politics,
and Unauthorized Genders, 10 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L. J. 365 (1992)
[hereinafter Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity] ; Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss,
We Are Symbols and Inhabit Symbols, So Should We Be Paying Rent?
Deconstructingthe Lanham Act and Rights of Publicity, 20 Colum.-VLA J. L. &
Arts (1996); Michael Madow, Private Ownership of Public Image: Popular
Culture and Publicity Rights, 81 CAL. L. REv. 127 (1993). One of the earliest
critics of publicity rights, whose work was quoted in Ralph's lecture and whose
influence remains visible in the work of subsequent scholars is David Lange.
See, David Lange, Recognizing the Public Domain, 44 J. LAW & CONTEMP.
PROBS. 147 (1981) [hereinafter Lange].
9 Actually, it would be interesting to consider how much of the right of
publicity could survive a rigorous application of the idea/expression division
that limits copyright. The United States Supreme Court has upheld the right of
publicity in one case, and it involved one of the few instances where one could
reasonably talk about a violation of publicity interests as taking "expression"
rather than ideas or facts. In Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/5
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we concerned with the use of clearly identifiable names and faces.
Mere "suggestion" will do quite well, say, for instance, a voice or a
face that resembles someone else's; 0 or a mixture of visual cues
that "conjure up" the image of a celebrity (for example, a robot in a
blond wig and red gown standing before a game board)."
The durational boundaries of the right have also become more
generous in many jurisdictions than those to which copyright
holders in their most covetous moments have yet aspired.
Copyrights, as a constitutional matter, can only last for a limited
time - currently (and controversially), for the life of the author plus
70 years. 2 But publicity rights now endure in some places for as
much as a century after the person's death, and, in one state, have
the potential to last forever. 3 No functional equivalent of "fair
use" has evolved, either. It is true that publicity rights cannot be
enforced where the defendant makes a "newsworthy" use of
someone's identity, but that is hardly the equivalent of fair use.
Rather, newsworthy uses fall outside the property right and
therefore do not "infringe" it in the first place. A fair use would
excuse an otherwise infringing "commercial" use -- and that is

U.S. 562 (1977), the Court ruled that a publicity claim survived a First
Amendment defense where the defendant broadcaster photographed and played
on a news show the plaintiff s entire act from start to finish. The taking was not
of a face or a name, or even a style of performing, but rather of a discrete
performance by a particular individual.
10 See, e.g., Midler v. Young & Rubicam, Inc., 849 F.2d 460 (9th Cir. 1988),
cert. denied, 503 U.S. 951 (1992) (actress and singer Bette Midler's publicity
right infringed by use of singer with a similar voice in a car commercial).
11 White v. Samsung Electronics America, Inc., 971 F.2d 1395 (9th Cir.
1992) reh'g denied, 989 F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 95
(1993) (game show hostess Vanna White's publicity right infringed by parody
in advertisement).
12 Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA), Pub. L. No. 105-304, 112
Stat. 2860 (1998) (codified in scattered sections of 17 U.S.C.).
13 Indiana and Oklahoma provide protection for the life of the person plus
100 years, IND. CODE ANN. § 32-13-1-8 (Michie 1995); OKLA. STAT. 12, §
1448-49 (1991). Tennessee preserves the right for ten years, but permits heirs
and assigns who exploit publicity values during that time to preserve them
unless and until they abandon their use for two years - a potential right in
perpetuity.
TENN. CODE ANN.
§ 47-25-1104 (1997).
Published by
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something that virtually never occurs in the right of publicity case
14
law.
Why have publicity rights continued to take a direction that
seems to fail most, if not all, of Ralph's suggested tests for an
appropriately tailored property right in information? I regret to say
that I think the answer lies in a flaw in Ralph's basic premise. He
had an abiding faith that intellectual property law had an internal
coherence, and that from it one could generate a set of rational
constraints that would mark off the border between what could be
commodified and what must remain in the public domain. He, I
think, believed that courts and legislatures would ultimately be

14 1 can think of two possible cases that might exemplify something akin to a
"fair use" defense. Both involved the use for commercial purposes of the names
or faces of political figures. The first was a suit by comedian Pat Paulsen
during his candidacy for President of the United States. Paulsen objected to the
use of his image on posters, but the court declined to allow him to enjoin the use
either under a New York statute prohibiting commercial uses of identity, N.Y.
CIV. RTS. §§ 50-51 (McKinney 1998) or on the grounds that his publicity
rights were violated. The court said the use was protected as newsworthy, even
if Paulsen's campaign was a publicity stunt rather than a serious effort. The
court did, however, leave open the possibility that Paulsen could sue for
damages. Paulsen v. Personality Posters, Inc., 299 N.Y.S.2d 501, 507-08 (N.Y.
Sup. Ct. 1968). The second, also arising under the New York statute, involved
the use of New York Mayor Rudy Guliani's name in an advertisement for New
York Magazine. The trial court found the use privileged under the First
Amendment, in part as parody, and the Second Circuit affirmed, albeit on
somewhat different grounds.
New York Magazine v. Metropolitan
Transportation Authority, 987 F. Supp. 257, 268-69 (S.D.N.Y. 1997), aff'd 136
F.3d 123 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 119 S.Ct. 68 (1998).
There may be other
examples, but assuredly not many. The Ninth Circuit, for instance, did not
recognize any special privilege for an obvious use of parody in advertising in
the Vanna White litigation. White, 971 F. 2d 1395 (9th Cir.), reh 'g denied, 989
F.2d 1512 (9th Cir. 1992), cert. denied, 508 U.S. 951 (1993). Nor was a district
court in Texas inclined to privilege the wit in a playful advertisement for men's
shirts. The ad showed a man, identified as Don, wearing a "henley" brand shirt.
The caption referred to the shirt as "Don's henley." Musician Don Henley
prevailed on his right of publicity claim. Henley v. Dillard Dept. Stores, 46 F.
Supp. 2d 587 (N.D. Tex. 1999).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/5
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guided by these constraints. Fifteen years ago, that view was still
plausible.'

In those halcyon days, copyright, patent law and other forms of
intellectual property were still generally thought of as means used
to achieve important public benefits. The limited monopoly
provided by copyright, for instance, was intended to give authors
enough of an incentive to create new works, but not more. At the
point where additions to the statutory monopoly could not
convincingly be shown to net the public at least an equivalent
increment of value in return, further protection could not be
justified.16 Copyright was understood as maintaining a critical
balance, protecting specific works of authorship, while
simultaneously preserving the building blocks of expression -ideas, facts and theories -- free for the use of all. 7 A rich public
15 Many of the most respected intellectual property scholars working today
continue to argue that the theory and structure of intellectual property rights
imposes limits on how far property interests can be expanded. See, e.g., Wendy
J. Gordon, A Property Right in Self-Expression: Equality and Individualism in
the Natural Law of IntellectualProperty, 102 YALE L. J. 1533 (1993) (arguing

that copyright theory, properly understood and applied, would protect speech
values); Marci A. Hamilton, The TRIPS Agreement: Imperialistic, Outdated,

and Overprotective, 29 VAND. J. TRANSNAT'L L. 613 (1996) (arguing that
intellectual property limits overstepped by TRIPS); Mark A. Lemley, Beyond
Preemption: The Law and Policy of Intellectual PropertyLicensing, 87 CALIF.

L. REV. 111 (1999) (criticizing proposed modifications of Uniform Commercial
Code as violating copyright norms); J. H. Reichman & Pamela Samuelson,
Intellectual Property Rights in Data?, 50 VAND. L. REV. 51 (1997) (arguing

that aggressive protection of databases violates copyright norms). I do not
disagree with their theoretical points, but argue that, as a practical matter,
legislation, international trade agreements and even judicial decisions have
chosen to ignore those theoretical boundaries to an extent that makes it difficult
for me to state that they continue to have any real life left in them.
16 A classic statement of this position with regard to copyrights appears in
Twentieth Century Music Corp. v. Aiken, 422 U.S. 151, 156 (1975); with regard
to patents, see Graham v. John Deere Co., 383 U.S. 1, 5-10 (1966). This thesis
remains alive among a large portion of the academic community involved with
intellectual property, although it is on the decline elsewhere. See scholars cited
in note 14, supra.

17 See, e.g., Feist Publications, Inc. v. Rural Telephone Service, 499 U.S.
340, 349-50 (1991) (only original expression can be protected; the ideas and
in a work are free for
others to build upon).
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by Digital Commons@DePaul,
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domain was not a byproduct of copyright, but an essential part of
the package. It was necessary, not only for public edification and
enjoyment, but to assure that successive generations of creators
would have unfettered access to the raw materials from which to
fashion new works. 8 By analogy, those forms of intellectual
property rights in information not provided for in the Constitution
ought to be supported by a similar set of convincing justifications,
be animated by considerations of the public weal, and ought not to
remove from the public domain any more material than absolutely
necessary to achieve their goals.
Sadly, as a matter of positive law, that consensus, and hence any
basis for relying on intellectual property theory as a source of
limitations, has, in my opinion, evaporated.19 Even within
copyright law 'itself, the careful compromises between private
profit and protection of the public domain show signs of eroding.2"
18 The case for the importance of a rich public domain has been made
particularly well by Professors Jessica Litman, David Lange and Yochai
Benider. Yochai Benider, Free as the Air to Common Use: First Amendment
Constraintson Enclosure of the Public Domain, 74 N.Y.U. L. REV. 354 (1999);
Jessica Litman, The Public Domain, 39 EMoRY L. L 965 (1990); Lange, supra
note 8.
19 There are occasional heartening exceptions, however, that must be
gratefully acknowledged. The Eleventh Circuit, for example, recently ruled that
a first sale doctrine modeled after that in copyright applies to the right of
publicity. As a result, the widow of a deceased automobile racer was
unsuccessful in her claim that a retailer who legally obtained authorized sports
trading cards and then mounted them on plaques had violated the racer's right of
publicity. Allison v. Vintage Sports Plaques, 136 F.3d 1443 (11th Cir. 1998).
When I say that the consensus has evaporated, I speak, of course, of the
consensus among legislators and judges. Members of the academy continue
bravely to defend the existence of limits within intellectual property law to a
continuous expansion of property rights, but with only limited success. See note
14, supra.
20 In retrospect, the most dramatic erosion of the public domain occurred in
1976 when Congress, in the new Copyright Act, declared that henceforth a work
of authorship would be covered by copyright once it was fixed in tangible form.
Whatever the drawbacks of the 1909 Copyright Act and its predecessors, they
did not presume that everything from a casual posting on a bulletin board to the
great American novel were automatically intellectual property entitled to federal
protection. Once a work was "published," the author had to comply with
particular conditions to obtain and retain statutory protection. More modem
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/5
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But, certainly, whenever copyright rules are too "inflexible" to
protect a prospective source of value embodied in an information
good, the prevailing view is that we should find some other body
of law, invented or reinterpreted, to "take care of the problem."
Copyright does not protect "sweat of the brow" in compiling facts?
Then we need to "correct" this flaw by a new law to protect
collections of information.' If celebrity has value to the public,
we ought to create new rights to capture that value, and perhaps
expand as well our definitions of trademark and unfair trade
practices to take care of any unforeseen contingencies.22
Possibly because intellectual property today is seen through the
lens of trade policy rather than through the more abstract lens of
information policy, authors, creators, their heirs and assigns have
received willing support from government agencies, legislators and
courts for their belief that they are entitled to as much as the
market will bear in return for the contributions they make to the
social good. The public interest has been largely disarmed as a
counterweight to the claims of private owners by a semantic slight
of hand that treats the public interest as automatically furthered by
whatever benefits authors and owners. Under this philosophy, it is
only a slight exaggeration to fear that the public domain will be
transmuted from an essential element of our shared intellectual
capital into the equivalent of a solid waste transfer station for those
dregs of information generally conceded to be worthless.

examples of changes in copyright law that reduce the public domain include
provisions allowing lapsed copyrights to be restored, 17 U.S.C. § 104A (2000)
and increasing the term of copyrights. Id. at § 302. Users' ability to exploit
specific copies of work they have purchased has also been reduced by cut-backs
in the first sale doctrine. Id. at § 109 (b). This is further threatened by the
protection provided to security devices that limit access to materials distributed
in digital form. DMCA, supra note 12.
21 See e.g., Collections of Information Antipiracy Act, H.R. 354 (106th
Cong., 1st Sess.)(1999) (bill to protect databases).
22 For interesting discussions of the expanding concepts of trademark and
unfair trade practices, see Mark A. Lemley, The Modern Lanham Act and the
Death of Common Sense, Symposium, 108 YALE L. J. 1687 (1999); Jessica
Litman, Breakfast with Batman: The Public Interest in the Advertising Age,
Symposium,
108 YALE L. J. 1717
(1999).
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Although I part company, reluctantly, with Ralph Brown's faith
in the self-limiting nature of intellectual property, I continue to
believe that firm limits do exist to the commodification of
information and ideas. But I would argue that they are far more
likely to come from the First Amendment than from the copyright
clause.23
Intellectual property scholars are chary of talking about the First
Amendment. 4 Indeed, much of the literature about such obvious
candidates for scrutiny under that provision, such as the proposed
database legislation, barely mentions the possibility that it would
be unconstitutional to grant private ownership in facts. In that
regard, the right of publicity, has been somewhat unusual because,
from its earliest roots in the tort law of privacy, writers have
acknowledged that the First Amendment plays a limiting role2 -although as I have argued elsewhere, the how large a role has been
greatly and continuously underestimated.
I would like to begin this conversation about property rights in
information, therefore, by laying out a different set of premises
from Ralph's and argue that they ought to underpin our
understanding of the kinds and extent of the rights that can
legitimately be recognized. First, I would argue that copyright
rests on a different footing from other property rights in
information goods. The commodification of original writings by
authors is provided for in the Constitution. No other form of
property interest in informational works has a similar constitutional
basis. Hence, any form of property right in informational material
that is not provided for under the copyright clause should be
23 Congress often legislated intellectual property rights that do not meet the
standards for copyright under its commerce power, and the states have similarly
evolved intellectual property rights without running into serious limits, at least
this far, from preemption,
24 Two notable exceptions are Jessica Litman and Yochai Benkler. See, e.g.,
Jessica Litman, Copyrightand Information Policy, 55 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS.

185 (1991); Benkler, supra note 18
25 See, e.g., J. Thomas McCarthy, The Rights of Publicity and Privacy, § 8.6
(Rev. 1998); Roberta Kwall, The Right of Publicity vs. the FirstAmendment: A
Propertyand LiabilityRule Analysis, 70 IND. L.J. 47 (1994); Peter L. Felcher &
Edward L. Rubin, The Descendibility of the Right of Publicity: Is There
CommercialLife After Death?, 89 YALE L.J. 1125 (1980).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/5
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required to meet the same tests for validity that are applied to other
forms of government regulation of speech. This standard will be
difficult to meet because, in my view, these common law and
statutory provisions are content-based, rather than content neutral.26
The question of free speech limitations on intellectual property
outside copyright cannot be avoided by the semantic sleight of
hand that is accurately described by Bela Lugosi, Jr., in his
contribution to this symposium. Mr. Lugosi says, correctly, that
26 A content-based regulation of speech can only be upheld if the rationale
supporting it meets a compelling state interest test. Simon & Schuster, Inc. v.
Members of New York State Crime Victims Board, 502 U.S. 105, 116 (1991).
Content-neutral regulations can be justified merely by the assertion of an
important or substantial interest. See generally United States v. O'Brien, 391
U.S. 367 (1968). I would argue that publicity rights rules are content-based
because, as in Simon & Schuster, they are directed entirely at speech activities
and are defined by a particular subject matter. Compare Erznoznick v. City of
Jacksonville, 422 U.S. 205 (1975) (ban on exhibition of nudity on movie
screens visible from streets content-based) with United States Civil Service
Comm'n v. National Ass'n of Letter Carriers, 413 U.S. 548 (1973) (ban on
political activity by federal employees not content-based even though it impacts
on political speech). The distinction between content-based and content-neutral,
however, can be difficult to discern and has led the Court into many
determinations that appear to be quite inconsistent with one another. Two
circumstances might argue for lower levels of scrutiny for content-based
regulation of speech. First, the Court has intimated that some noncommercial
speech might be subjected to restrictions on less strict standards of review
because it is less valuable than core first amendment speech. See, e.g., FCC v.
Pacifica Foundation, 438 U.S. 726 (1978) (Stevens, J., for plurality). Or speech
may be restricted because of its "secondary effects." Renton v. Playtime
Theatres, Inc., 475 U.S. 41 (1986). The problem with the first rationale is linedrawing. Either "core" speech must be restricted to some very narrow category
like speech directly about the political system (leaving lots of very valued
speech with less protection) or the line must be drawn according to some
subjective evaluation by judges of which speech is and is not worthy -- a highly
objectionable process. As for the secondary effects rational, it has been applied
in cases where the government claims that it intends to prevent non-speech
effects like crime (the secondary effect that led to upholding limits on
bookstores, theaters and so on, offering "adult entertainment"). It is not clear
that the government's desire to prevent economic losses to individuals through
unconsented uses of information about themselves can properly be called a
"secondary effect." Rather, it is a rejection on the free speech side of any role
the public
domain.
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"courts have noted that the First Amendment's protection of free
expression does not afford infringers the right to appropriate
legally recognized property and intellectual property rights." But
what courts leave out when they fall back on this formulation is
that whether or not something can be a "legally recognized" right
is itself a determination that must be informed by the First
Amendment. The mere fact that information,27 were it privately
controlled, could generate income for an owner does not, standing
alone, provide a sufficient justification for its commodifying it and
placing it beyond the reach of First Amendment analysis.
That is, of course, not to deny that property rights in information
can exist outside the copyright clause. The Supreme Court has
recognized trademarks, unfair trade practices and trade secrets law
as well as rights of publicity and misappropriation as forms of
intellectual property rights that can limit the use of information. I
would argue, however, that the scope given to these rights by the
Court has tended to be quite narrow.28 The only right of publicity
case ever upheld (or for that matter, decided) by the Court, for
example, involved a broadcast, without permission, of a

27 I use the word "information" here in its most capacious sense, in part for
want of a better term. What I mean by it is all material that is intended to
communicate, whether the communication be of facts or feelings or an aesthetic
sensibility. I understand all these elements of communication to receive the
First Amendment's protection, thus grouping the visual arts, poetry and fiction
along with the contents of the daily newspaper. When someone wears a shirt
with a celebrity's face on it, I would argue that the use is communicative and
that it conveys "information."
28 The fact that the exceptions are narrow does not, however, mean that they
are never problematic from the perspective of the First Amendment. See, e.g.,
San Francisco Arts & Athletics, Inc. v. United States Olympics Comm., 483
U.S. 522 (1987). In that case, the Supreme Court upheld the exclusive right of
the United States Olympics Committee to use the word "Olympics" and denied
use of the term to a group running what they had called the "Gay Olympics."
One might have supposed that the word "Olympics" was one of those important
building blocks in the public domain, but the Court did not so find. For an
excellent analysis of the case and the problem it raises, see Rochelle C.

Dreyfuss, Expressive Genericity: Trademarks as Language in the Pepsi
Generation, 68 NOTREDAMEL. REv. 397 (1990).
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performer's entire act.2 ' The most unabashedly broad property
right ever recognized by the Court was that of a news service in the
contents of its uncopyrighted reporting." ° Although the Court
continues to cite to this opinion from time to time, the general
consensus is that subsequent developments in First Amendment
case law have largely eroded the misappropriation doctrine on
which the holding relied.3 '
I will examine some of the
justifications for these exceptions in more detail later in the course
of discussing publicity rights, but suffice it to say for now that, in
my opinion, they are not capacious enough to support much of the
current expansion of intellectual property law.
As I mentioned previously, both its advocates and opponents
have always agreed that the scope of any possible property interest
in publicity is limited by the free speech clause of the Constitution.
If a use of a celebrity's identity occurs in a "newsworthy" setting,
the use does not, all concede, violate any property right.32 But
matters quickly go awry because the flip-side assumption seems to
be that if a use is not newsworthy, it must perforce be commercial.
And if it is commercial, then it does not have a First Amendment
dimension and is fair game for regulation.3
Whatever sense this dichotomous approach may have made in
the early history of publicity's evolution, before the courts began to
expand the First Amendment beyond news to art and entertainment
29 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
Once the Court found a protectable property interest, however, it rejected the
argument that, because the broadcast occurred as part of a news program, that it
was privileged by the First Amendment.
30 International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
31 Restatement (Third) Of Unfair Competition, § 38, comments b and c
(1995) (expressing great skepticism about the validity of the misappropriation
doctrine and urging at most a very narrow application of it); National
Basketball Ass'n v. Motorola, 105 F.3d 841, 852 & n. 7 (2d Cir. 1997)
(recognizing a very narrow role for misappropriation and observing the
disrepute into which the doctrine has fallen).
32 The border between newsworthy and nonnewsworthy, however, is
becoming increasingly contested. See, e.g., Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC,
Inc., 33 F. Supp.2d 897 (C.D. Cal. 1999) (applying right of publicity to article
about fashion).
Zimmerman,
Publicity,supra
note 5 at 57-59.
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as well,34 once the expansion occurred, this division quickly ceased
to be reasonable. The assumptions underlying publicity law
became even more problematic when the Court extended an
intermediate level of First Amendment protection to commercial
speech.35 Now "commercial" speech, too, is inside the First
Amendment, even if protected by a less rigorous set of rules than
other kinds of protected speech. It is important to add, however,
that what the Supreme Court calls "commercial speech" and what
counts as "commercial" in publicity law are not identical
categories.
The Supreme Court since the mid-1970s has
experimented with - but not settled on - various definitions of
commercial speech, including "speech that promotes a commercial
transaction ' and "expression related solely to the economic
interests of the speaker and its audience;" 37 however, the quest for
a definition ultimately comes out, it seems fairly clear that the
Court is talking about a category limited to advertising or other
speech directly promoting the sale of products and services, and
not about communications that are engaged in to make money.38 In
short, therefore, it appears that the kinds of "commercial" activities
that Ralph Brown thought were troubling places to apply publicity
rights are, in many circumstances, fully protected speech.

34 See, e.g., Joseph Burston, Inc. v. Wilson, 343 U.S. 495 (1952) (motion
pictures are protected speech even though they are designed to entertain rather
than to inform).
35 Virginia State Board of Pharmacy v. Virginia Citizens Consumer Council,
Inc., 425 U.S. 748 (1976).
36 Id. at 760-62.
37 Central Hudson Gas & Electric Corp. v. Public Service Comm'n, 447 U.S.
557, 561 (1980).
38 See, e.g., City of Cincinnati v. Discovery Network, Inc., 507 U.S. 410,
423 (1993); Board of Trustees of the State University of New York v. Fox, 492
U.S. 469, 473-74 (1989). Even where a product or service is promoted by the
speech, it may nevertheless be fully protected, see, e.g., Bigelow v. Virginia,
421 U.S. 809 (1975) (paid advertisement communicating information about
abortion services is fully protected speech). I have argued elsewhere that
changes in the law governing commercial speech probably give more First
Amendment protection to advertising that the right of publicity currently
recognizes.
I will not, however, discuss those arguments here.
See
Zimmerman, Publicity, supra note 5, at 67-80.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/5
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This analysis gives new punch to the questions Brown asked in
his Brace lecture. Why shouldn't an Elvis Presley imitator be
allowed to put together a show based on old Elvis songs as long as
he does not violate any copyrights and does not try to pass himself
off as the real thing? Why shouldn't someone make and market a
bust of Martin Luther King -- or for that matter use famous names
or faces on T-shirts, or on baseball trading cards, or in
commemorative memorabilia? Isn't all of it protected speech?
The response that cuts this argument to shreds does not leap off
the pages of the legal literature or the judicial decisions. Courts
have tried a number of justifications for their very broad definition
of commercial use, ranging from the argument that the maker of
the offending work "merely" wants to make a profit from it,39 to
one that the work lacked a sufficient "creative component" or
enough social value to constitute protected speech.4" These
rationales have led legislators and courts so far in some
jurisdictions that the editorial content of publications is now
subject to the publicity right if the particular use at issue is deemed
not to constitute "news" but, rather, crass commercialism.4" Courts
have become too comfortable over the years with the mantra that
non-advertising "commercial" uses are a violation of property
rights rather than an appropriate exercise of a free speech right to
question it.42 But question it they should.
39 The Martin Luther King, Jr., Center for Social Change, Inc. v. American
Heritage Products, Inc., 296 S.E. 2d 697, 702 (Ga. 1982).
40 Estate of Presley v. Russen, 513 F. Supp. 1339, 1359 (D.N.J. 1981).
41 Hoffman v. Capital Cities/ABC, Inc., 33 F. Supp. 2d 867 (C.D. Cal. 1999)
(Dustin Hoffnan's head, made up as the character Tootsie, superimposed on
body of model for a magazine article on current fashion).
42 One notable exception is Cardtoons, L.C. v. Major League Baseball
Players Ass'n., 95 F.3d 959 (10th Cir. 1996). The Court of Appeals found that
Oklahoma's right of publicity statute was unconstitutional as applied to baseball
cards. The court found that the cards were fully protected speech. This holding
is striking in particular because baseball cards were the first subject matter of a
right of publicity case. In Haelan Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing Gum,
Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 816 (1953), Judge Jerome
Frank determined that famous people had a property interest in the use of their
names or faces that allowed them to control the use by others of those assets for
their own profit. Unlike a privacy right, this one was not personal to the
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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A simple example demonstrates why. Let us assume that an
artist uses the likeness of a well-known person as the subject of an
original painting or a drawing. Has the artist violated the publicity
rights of that individual, or has she instead engaged in protected
activity? This question has not, so far as I know, been definitively
decided by any court, but several publicity statutes specifically
exempt "original works of art."" It seems a stretch to imagine, in
any event, that the Supreme Court, which in other contexts, has
said that publicly available information about other people can
virtually always be used in the protected speech activities of others,
would require an artist to obtain a license to use a face before she
could paint it.' Once the law begins down that path, it becomes
difficult to explain why any information about living or dead
people should be available free to anyone who wants to use it to
produce speech protected by the First Amendment.45 But freedom
of speech, without a vast public domain to feed it, would be akin to
freedom to breathe, but only if you first buy the air. One could
certainly conceive "freedoms" or "rights" that could be exercised
individual and could be conveyed. The celebrity in the case had conveyed
exclusive rights to use his name and face on trading cards to one company, and
then went on to enter into a similar agreement with a second.
43 See, e.g., CAL. CIV. CODE § 3344.1(A)(2) (West 2000); FLA. STAT. ANN.
§ 540.08 (1999); 765 ILCS 1075/35(b)(1).
44 Many well-known artists have used recognizable images in their work.
Andy Warhol's use of the face of Marilyn Monroe is but one example. In a
right of privacy decision, the United States Supreme Court cautioned that
individuals did not have any general right to prevent the use of their identity or
facts about themselves in the speech of others. "Exposure of the self to others in
varying degrees," wrote Justice Brennan for the Court, "is a concomitant of life
in a civilized community. The risk of this exposure is an essential element of
life in a society which places a primary value on freedom of speech and of
press." Time, Inc. v. Hill, 385 U.S. 374, 388 (1967). The Hill case involved
use of identifying information about real people in a fictional dramatization.
45 I realize that information is paid for on a regular basis, and I do not
suggest that there is anything wrong with that. Books, newspapers, newsletters,
television programming are all sold in one way or another. What I mean by
"free" in this context is that, once an individual gains access to information,
whether by purchasing an information package that contains it or by other
means, the information can be used without a need to obtain a license or pay any
additional sum for the privilege. If information in the public domain is
obtained, its reuse is "free."
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/5
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only if individuals had the wherewithal to pay for the privilege, but
I do not think this society has ever considered freedom of speech
using lawfully obtained, uncopyrighted, facts, ideas, theories and
images in that way. Indeed, it is difficult to see how either the
political or the autonomy functions of the First Amendment could
be fulfilled for each individual in so radically commodified an
information environment.
If you accept the initial premise, therefore, that an artist's
original work of art is protected speech, one must also assume that
selling the work to a patron for money, while commercial in
nature, does not strip away First Amendment protection for what
the artist has produced. The Supreme Court has said many times
that speech does not lose its protected status simply because a
motive for engaging in it is to make money.46
So what does mark the divide between information uses that a
celebrity can and cannot control? A California appellate court
recently tried to wrestle with this question, and the difficulties it
experienced are instructive.47 Saderup, an artist, started by making
a charcoal sketch of the deceased comedians known as the Three
Stooges, an activity for which, based on our previous analysis, he
presumably needed no permission.48 The hard question, then, is
why did Saderup's next move, in the Court's view, push him
across the line into a violation of the actors' property rights. He
used his sketch as a master from which to produce silk-screened
images on T-shirts and lithographed posters, and, it is true, sold
them at a profit -- at the time of the suit, some $75,000 worth.
If it was permissible to use the images of the Three Stooges for
the original sketch, and if Saderup was entitled to sell the original
sketch without losing constitutional protection for his choice of
subject matter, why did he lose that protection by proliferating
46 Riley v. National Federation of the Blind of North Carolina, 487 U.S. 781,
801 (1988); First National Bank of Boston v. Belloti, 435 U.S. 765, 784 (1978);
New York Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 266 (1964).
47 Comedy III Productions, Inc. v. Gary Saderup, Inc., 80 Cal. Rptr. 2d 464
(Cal. App. 1999). The case is now on appeal to the California Supreme Court.
48 The court assumed, arguendo, that the original charcoal sketch was
exempt from the publicity right under applicable California law because it was a
of"fme
art." Id. at 471. 2016
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copies of his work? The court intimated that making multiple
copies was what made the difference between protected and
unprotected activity.4 9 But a poem is protected by the First
Amendment whether it exists in a single manuscript or is
reproduced by its author thousands of times. The protection given
to a work of art is presumably similar to that provided for literary
works. It is hard to understand, therefore, why Saderup's sketch
should lose its status as protected expression somewhere along the
route from a single original to multiple signed and numbered
copies, to an image reproduced a thousand times for sale as an
inexpensive poster. The content has changed not one whit.
To follow the matter a little further, should speech cease to be
protected if the drawing (or the poem) is reprinted on cotton (a Tshirt), or on ceramic vessel (a coffee mug) or on plastic (a swizzle
stick) instead of on paper or a stretched canvas? The utilitarian
function of such objects does not change the nature or
expressiveness of the images or text printed on them. Although the
situation has not arisen often, the Supreme Court has recognized
that clothing and other objects can be vehicles for expression, and
hence that their expressive content may be entitled to First
Amendment protection.5" To claim convincingly, therefore, that
speech quality of art is lost when an image is proliferated or
attached to a utilitarian object needs a more thoughtful defense
than this court, and most other courts before it, have tried to mount.
The California court avoided engaging these complexities,
however, by opting to switch the burden of proof to Saderup to
convince the court that his use of the Three Stooges' image was
49 "Simply put," Judge Fukoto wrote, "although the First Amendment
protects speech that is sold ..., reproductions of an image, made to be sold for
profit, do not per se constitute speech." Id. at 470.
50 See, e.g., Cohen v. California, 403 U.S. 15 (1971) (jacket bearing a logo
critical of the draft a form of communication); Tinker v. Des Moines School
District, 393 U.S. 503 (1969) (wearing a black arm band a form of protected
communication); cf Smith v. Goguen, 415 U.S. 566 (1974) (conviction for
wearing flag sewn on seat of defendant's pants overturned on vagueness
grounds but the Court recognized that First Amendment activity was
implicated); Spence v. State of Washington, 418 U.S. 405 (1974) (fixing a peace
symbol to American flag a form of protected communication).
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/5
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either "art or speech as a constitutional matter," and then
concluding that Saderup had failed to satisfy the burden.
According to the court, the defendants failed to prove that the
reproductions were "expressive of any message, idea, emotion - or
anything, other than the likenesses of the Three Stooges."51 But
ruling that a defendant must prove his entitlement to protection for
pictorial representations is an odd tack if one pauses a moment to
think about it. If speakers can only claim First Amendment
protection if they are first able to convince a judge or a jury that
their speech is sufficiently important and weighty to deserve it, it
would be tantamount to concluding that only speech that satisfies
the personal predilections of the finder of fact is protected. A
presumption of protection puts the shoe on the right foot: the
burden ought to fall on the party who claims the speech is
wrongful.
The court got itself backed into this odd posture, I suspect,
because it was understandably keen not to throw out 50 years of
legal precedent or to find a state statute unconstitutional. The court
admitted that, if it had to treat the defendant's sketch (when
reproduced in multiple copies) as "art" for First Amendment
purposes, it "would in essence mean that the First Amendment
would shield virtually any representation from coverage by [the
state's right of publicity statute]. ' 's2
Well, that is a problem for the publicity tort, all right, and it is
why, in my view, Ralph Brown was right to be chary of these sorts
of claims. Free speech protection is not only for works of high
intellectual value, or expressly political content or, for that matter,
only for "fine" or unique works of art as opposed to trivial or
widely circulated ones.
Making such distinctions engages
legislatures, administrative agencies, courts and juries in a highly
subjective and elitist enterprise completely alien to the idea that
citizens, rather than their government, decide what they want to
hear and to say.
Interestingly enough, if the question were turned around, and the
issue were the protectability of low-brow works as intellectual
51 Comedy

m11,
80 Cal. Rptr.2d at 470.
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property, there is little doubt that the courts would shy away from
applying the kind of value-laden test -they feel comfortable using in
publicity cases. Almost a century ago, the United States Supreme
Court said that there was no way to make a principled distinction
for purposes of copyright protection between works of high artistic
or informative value and ones of merely pedestrian worth. Justice
Holmes, writing for the Court in Bleistein v. Donaldson
Lithographing Co.,5 3 went through a number of possible grounds
on which the Court could deny copyright protection to circus
posters depicting acrobats and dancing girls. After rejecting them
one by one as too vague and unmanageable, Justice Holmes
concluded:
It would be a dangerous undertaking for persons
trained only to the law to constitute themselves final
judges of the worth of pictorial illustrations, outside
of the narrowest and most obvious limits. At the
one extreme some works of genius would be sure to
miss appreciation. Their very novelty would make
them repulsive until the public had learned the new
language in which their author spoke. It may be
more than doubted, for instance, whether the
etchings of Goya or the paintings of Manet would
have been sure of protection when seen for the first
time. At the other end, copyright would be denied to
pictures which appealed to a public less educated
than the judge. Yet if they command the interest of
any public, they have commercial value - and it
would be bold to say they have not an aesthetic and
educational value- and the taste of the public is not
to be treated with contempt. 4
Admittedly, copyright and the First Amendment have different
objectives, but I think it would be hard to argue that the absence of
any principled basis for distinguishing between protected and
53 188 U.S. 239 (1903).
54 Id. at 251-52.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/5
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unprotected works based on their social "value" is less of a
problem for free speech purposes than for intellectual property
protection. Clearly, a court is on shaky ground whenever it engages
in arbitrary and ad hoc determinations that a commemorative bust
of Martin Luther King or Saderup's images of the Three Stooges
are expressive of nothing, whereas Gilbert Stuart's portraits of
George Washington (or Warhol's Marilyn Monroe, to bring up a
more modem example) do express something, and are therefore
worthy of constitutional protection.55
Acknowledging that the use of celebrity images on posters and
T-shirts is a form of speech, some have urged other grounds for
subjecting these sorts of expression to regulation. 6 One approach
is to fall back on that convenient old warhorse, United States v.
O'Brien.57 In O'Brien, the Supreme Court said that a law against
damaging or destroying draft cards did not offend the First
Amendment, even though it was used to punish the symbolic
speech involved in burning the card as a Vietnam war protest. 8
55 Vagueness in standards regulating speech is a classic reason to strike down
a statute. Kolender v. Lawson, 461 U.S. 352, 357 (1983); NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 432-33 (1963). Scholars on both sides of the argument agree that
the images and names of celebrities in our society carry an enormous amount of
expressive freight. Indeed, the entire reason that the public desires the
commodities bearing such images or names is the meaning invested for them in
this information.
Among those who have made the case for the symbolic
importance of celebrity, see Coombe, Author/izing the Celebrity, supra note 8:
Roberta Rosenthal Kwall, Fame, 73 IND. L. J. 1 (1997); Madow, Private
Ownership of PublicImage, supra note 8.
56 As my colleague, Bella Lugosi, points out in his contribution to this
symposium, amici who have submitted briefs to the California Supreme Court in
the appeal of the Comedy III v. Saderup decision are relying heavily on O'Brien
to argue that the use of the Three Stooges' images is illegal.

57 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
58 U.S. v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968). O'Brien was a case involving
conduct with expressive elements attached; in that way, it differs from the right
of publicity, which seeks to regulate expression directly. However, in
subsequent cases, conduct that was inextricably connected with expression - for
example, posting signs on public property - has been analyzed under O'Brien.
Members of City Council of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 466 U.S.
789 (1984). Hence, one might argue (although I think it a very big stretch) that
the right of publicity is a regulation that bars the "posting" of expressive
materials
on particular sorts of
goods. O'Brien set out a four-part test.
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Speech activities can be regulated under these circumstances if the
law is content-neutral -- that is, if it is aimed at a nonspeech harm
that flows from something other than the particular content of the
speech. For example, in O'Brien the objective was to protect draft
cards from intentional destruction or mutilation, irrespective of the
reason the damage was inflicted. That rationale does not work so
well in publicity rights cases. The harm of which plaintiffs
complain in these cases flows directly and solely from speech, and
speech with specific content, at that. The harm is the loss of the
power to control the value attached to celebrity as expressed to the
public through words and images.
Assuming, therefore, as I do, that the regulation of publicity
rights can only legitimately be described as content-based, the
standard that must be met to justify regulating it is a high one.
Based on existing precedent, the state may under certain
circumstances meet that burden by demonstrating a direct
deprivation of income from one's original works of authorship (or
something akin to it) of a sort that deprives the individual of
remuneration for his work product.
For example, when a
television station used Mr. Zacchini's entire act without his
permission," or record pirates copied other people's sound
recordings and sold the pirated versions as substitutes for the
originals,6" the Supreme Court was sufficiently impressed by the
need to overcome a potential market failure attributable to the
public goods problem associated with such endeavors that it was
willing to allow a remedy, even if the subject matter being
regulated was clearly a form of speech. But these are unusual
kinds of cases; only rarely right of publicity cases have facts
comparable to those in Zacchini, where specific, complete
performances by particular individuals are what is taken. More
commonly, the violations occur through the use of someone's
Expressive activity can be regulated if the objective is legitimately within the
government's power to achieve, the interest furthered is important, the interest is
unrelated to the content of the speech, and any incidental restriction imposed on
speech is no greater than necessary to achieve the government's objective. 391
U.S. at 376-77.
59 Zacchini, supranote 29, 433 U.S. 562 (1977).
60 Goldstein v. California, 412 U.S. 546 (1973)
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/5
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appearance or name or by allusion to her identifying
characteristics. These are not cases equivalent to the taking of
copyrightable expression. Thus, to defend the publicity right, a
simplistic reliance on cases like Zacchini will not be enough.
Ralph, in his Brace Lecture, was characteristically generous in
refusing to dismiss out of hand the possibility that some
countervailing arguments might exist that would sufficiently
justify publicity rights in nonadvertising cases -- although he was
clearly skeptical about it.6 ' I will (also characteristically, I fear)
skip the generosity and jump straight to the skepticism.
The most common claim is that the right of publicity is
necessary to supply incentives for talented people to engage in the
socially useful activity of developing their talent.62 This claim can
be thought about in two ways - economic and psychological -

neither of them very satisfactory. The economic argument is that
celebrities will under-invest in their careers if they are deprived of
the full economic benefit generated by their fame.63 The
explanation given for this phenomenon is that information about
celebrities is a form of public good, the consumption of which by
one person will not reduce the amount available to others. To get
people to produce desirable public goods like celebrity or fame,
therefore, the law must introduce artificial scarcity by the
assignment of exclusive rights. Otherwise, the producer will be
unable to use markets to capture enough of the value she creates to
compensate her for investing her time, talent and resources in its
production.
She will then turn to other, more profitable
enterprises, and consequently, a market failure will occur.
61 After listing the desire to prevent unjust enrichment as one possible
justification for preserving a limited publicity right, for example, Professor
Brown could not resist the addition of a damning qualifier: "[W]hat an empty
phrase that is," he wrote. Brown, UpstartCousins, supra note 2, at 305.
62 Many of the justifications discussed in this section could also be used to
explain other common law and statutory forms of intellectual property, but I will
focus here solely on their application to publicity.
63 This assumes, of course, that people who become famous do so for
personal economic gain -- an argument that might surprise Albert Einstein or
Mother Teresa. Nevertheless, any person interesting enough to the public to
make the use of their visage or other elements of identity worth attempting to
market
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Copyright is a classic example of the use of a scheme of legal
enclosure to fend off the risk that information goods will be underproduced. The Supreme Court in Zacchini drew an analogy
between copyright and the specific facts of that case (the taking of
a particular, complete performance) and concluded that permitting
the broadcast of Zacchini's performance without permission posed
the same threat of market failure that would exist if whole books
could be copied without permission. 4 It therefore said that state
law could legitimately to fend off that risk. It would be hard,
however, to parley the rationale for Zacchini into the sort of
compelling state interest that justifies allowing more ordinary types
of publicity claims.6" In most such cases, I have argued at greater
length elsewhere, the value at issue in the publicity claim is merely
a secondary by-product of activities that are engaged in for other
reasons.66 Not a shred of empirical data exists to show that anyone
would change her behavior with regard to her primary activity that is, that a person would invest less energy and talent in
becoming a sports star or entertainer or great civic figure -- if she
knew in advance that, after achieving fame, she would be unable to
capture licensing fees from putting her face on sweatshirts or
coffee mugs. Proof of this can be found in the fact that many
countries - Great Britain, for example - produce quite a healthy
crop of persons committed to becoming celebrities without the help
of a legally recognized publicity right. 67 But if I am right in my
earlier assertion that celebrity will be produced aplenty without the
kind of enclosure provided by publicity rights, then it ceases to be
evident why a property right should be assigned to further
encourage (dare I say, over encourage?) its production. 68 Thus, this
version of the incentives argument does not seem to do the job.
64 Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broadcasting Co., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)
65 Id.
66 Zimmerman, Publicity,supra note 5, at 77-78.
67 See Cairns v. Franklin Mint Co., 24 F. Supp.2d 1013, 1023-24 (C.D. Cal.
1998) (finding that Britain does not recognize publicity rights).
68 For works discussing economic arguments in favor of the right of
publicity, see RICHARD A. POSNER, ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 225 (1981);
William M. Landes & Richard A. Posner, An Economic Analysis of Copyright
Law, 18 J. LEGAL STUD. 325, 362-63 (1989) [hereinafter Landes & Posner];
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/5
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One could also argue that celebrities will lose incentives to
invest in fame because they will be demoralized if they cannot
capture the full value of that fame. This argument, too, is suspect
for the simple reason that lots of people who generate publicity
values have gotten on quite nicely without collecting a cent from
them. If British celebrities are demoralized by their failure to have
publicity rights, I suspect it is only because they see those rights so
temptingly displayed on the other side of the Atlantic. Were none
available anywhere, I doubt that anyone's sense of entitlement
would be violated.
Other candidates as justifications for publicity rights are the
prevention of unjust enrichment, or of free riding on the efforts of
others. These rationales, however much they differ from it in other
regards, share an assumption in common with the psychological
disincentive argument: that there is something unfair about
allowing others to participate in the value that is associated with
famous people. But is this really so? Or are "unjust enrichment"
and "free-riding" simply conclusions dressed up as analysis? I
would argue that they are, and that deconstructing them reveals
their poverty as justifications.
It actually is far from self-evident why failure to permit
celebrities to capture all value that flows from their visages and
names is unfair or a form of misappropriation. In many situations,
individuals make valuable contributions to the society without any
expectation of capturing fall remuneration for what they have
contributed. Students, for example, are not typically characterized
as capturers of unjust gains, or as free-riders, when they put their
education to profitable uses without paying ongoing royalties to
their teachers. As a result of competition, consumers frequently do
not pay every cent of the worth to them of the products they use;
we generally think that leaving this surplus with the consumer is
good public policy, and not unjust enrichment. As long as the
compensation schemes in place are adequate to keep enough good
Timothy P. Terrell & Jane S. Smith, Publicity, Liberty, and Intellectual
Property: A Conceptual and Economic Analysis of the Inheritability Issue, 34
EMORY L. J. 1 (1985) [hereinafter Terrell & Smith]; Richard A. Posner, The
Right of Privacy, 12 GA. L. REv. 393, 411 (1978).
Published by Digital Commons@DePaul, 2016
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people in teaching or enough companies in the business of making
desirable products, who should get the excess value -- producers or
consumers -- is a question we determine in light of broader social
policy goals. Why should the situation with the excess value of
celebrity be different? And the free-rider argument rings a
particularly false note in light of the fact that, as has been
persuasively argued by others, the public plays at least as great a
role in creating the value attached to fame as the celebrity herself.6 9
In the absence of either unfairness or an incentives-based
rationale for creating property rights, the only other reason I have
come across for why we might want to enclose information about
famous people is a "congestion" argument. This suggestion was
made in passing by Landes and Posner in discussing why publicity
rights ought to endure long after the death of the personality in
question, but it is hard to know how seriously to take it.7" For this
to be a powerful claim, one would need to posit a reason to care
about the fact that the value of a persona may be diminished by
overuse in the absence of a property regime. The incentive
argument might provide such a rationale, but since it does not seem
to work very well in publicity cases, what other alternative
justification for caring about congestion is available?7

69 See Coombe, supra note 8.
70 Landes & Posner, supra note 68 at 362-63. The authors spend a very brief
time on the argument, explaining why publicity rights should persist long after
death. They point out that rivalry may occur over uses of the identity of a figure
like George Washington, and that congestion, which would lower the value of
the right to use Washington's name or face, could occur without private

ownership to permit a market to form that will allocate the rights efficiently.
Humorously, the article to which the authors cite as the source of this
justification actually rejected it out of hand. Terrell & Smith, supra note 68, at

47-49.
71 Landes and Posner only discuss congestion in the context of asking
whether publicity rights should survive the celebrity. They say yes, even
thought they admit that prevention of free-riding and the provision of proper

incentives do not supply a justification for their position. Returns on the
investment in the development of celebrity that will not be received until far in
the future, they agree, play little role in providing incentives to engage in the
activity; if the return on an investment is unlikely to be garnered, not merely in
one's lifetime, but in the fairly near future, the promise of its capture is likely to
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Perhaps it is a response to the interests of a different set of
beneficiaries -- rival claimants to the resource who want property
rules to serve as an allocational mechanism.72 This approach
supposes potential appropriators who will place different values on
the right to use a particular celebrity's attributes. If a "low valuer"
is free to appropriate a celebrity image at will, he may do so, and,
as a result, cause someone else to whom the image is worth more
to forego using it because it is now stale, or insufficiently
distinctive, or has otherwise become tarnished for his purposes.
With a property regime in place, the higher valuer can instead
bargain with the owner for exclusive rights. Thus, publicity law
might be thought of as a way to ensure in cases of conflict that a
resource is directed to its highest and best use.
There are probably a lot of ways to think about this argument,
but at least three responses come to mind. First, there is an
empirical question about the size and scope of the "problem" that
congestion is likely to cause. Landes and Posner specifically
addressed it as an issue for the "advertising value of a name or
likeness."73 I can conceive of overuse as a possible problem for
advertisers (without necessarily being convinced, however, that the
problem is a serious one in need of a legal solution). But I have a
much harder time wrapping my mind around even the theoretical
play little role in the calculation about whether or not to invest one's time and
talents in that way. Landes & Posner, supra note 68, at 361-62.
72 Rival use cases crop up in the case law from time to time. An interesting
example of rivalry over the use of a celebrity's name can be found in MJ &
Partners Restaurant Limited Partnership, 10 F. Supp. 2d 922 (N.D. Ill. 1998).
Michael Jordan sold the right to use his name and persona in conjunction with
restaurants in the Chicago area in 1990. Several years later, Jordan and a chef
got together and planned to open a restaurant near the home of the Chicago
Bulls, which Jordan would help promote and which would display the star's
personal humidor (with his name on it) inside the restaurant. The beneficiary of
the 1990 agreement sued to enjoin the opening of the restaurant, and the district
court ruled against the defendant on a motion to dismiss, finding, among other
things, that the plaintiff had stated a claim for violation of Jordan's right of
publicity, which, at least in this context, it now owned. Id. at 929-31. The
original right of publicity case, Haelen Laboratories, Inc. v. Topps Chewing
Gum, Inc., 202 F.2d 866 (2d Cir. 1953), also involved a sports star who tried to
sell rights to use his image on trading cards to two different companies.
Landes
& Posner, supra note
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possibility of "congestion" as a serious problem for the kinds of
nonadvertising uses this paper addresses, much less why we would
want to prevent it by giving exclusive rights to the highest bidder.
Beyond empirics, however, loom larger, normative, questions.
Economists are often committed to the view that private property
leads to the most efficient exploitation of resources.
A
considerable body of literature, for example, has been devoted to
cataloguing the defects of leaving scarce resources subject to
common ownership.74 If such resources are not privately owned,
the argument goes, they will be subject to overuse and waste. But
this argument does not do much in helping to explain why property
rights in publicity are a good idea. As already pointed out, the
informational and symbolic values associated with celebrity are not
scarce resources, and it is not at all clear that they should be treated
as if they were. As a society, we are committed to promoting
speech, and, logically, to ensuring that anyone who desires it will
have reasonable access to the content that makes speaking socially
and personally worthwhile.
But even if efficiency arguments favor commodifying
information about important or interesting people, we may
nevertheless choose to reject markets as the most desirable way to
allocate goods on ethical, political and social grounds.75 Every
society holds some values in sufficient esteem that the thought of
subjecting them to markets is perceived as a violation of liberty or
as seriously wrong. This country, for instance, does not allow
markets in children, or permit individuals to sell themselves to

74 Garrett Hardin, The Tragedy of the Commons, 162 SCI. 1243 (1968),
reprinted in PERSPECTIVES ON PROPERTY LAW 132 (Robert C. Ellickson, Carol
M. Rose & Bruce A. Ackerman eds., 2d ed. 1995).
75 Distributional justice or other ethical considerations, for example, may
lead a society to reject the use of markets in certain areas, and even to prefer
results that are not efficient. For example, where food is scarce, a society could
allow markets to take care of allocation - but it could also conclude that
humanitarian and moral considerations demand that food be shared rather than
being doled out preferentially to those with greater wealth or the potential of
higher levels of productivity. Terrell and Smith, for example, argue that
markets are not the proper mechanism for dealing with the values that publicity
rights encompass. Terrell & Smith, supra note 68, at 49-50.
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others as slaves.76 While markets provide an efficient mechanism
for ranking preferences, some areas exist in which individuals
arguably should not be put to, or allowed to make, particular kinds
of trades."
Free speech is one of those areas set apart for special treatment
and its exercise has historically enjoyed considerable protection
from economic markets. It is well established, for example, that in
all but the most unusual circumstances,"8 "newsworthy" content,
including information about people, is not subject to private
ownership or most other forms of exclusive control.79 Speech
protection is not limited to things that are newsworthy, of course,
and thus by extension, the same reasoning that prohibits ownership
of newsworthy information would seem to apply to information
used in any other fully protected speech activity.8" It would be
difficult, if not impossible, to achieve the goals of the First
Amendment, whether individual self-realization or informed
political participation, without the availability of such a common.8 '
76 Margaret Jane Radin, Market-Inalienability, 100 HARv. L. REv. 1849
(1987); MARGARET JANE RADIN, CONTESTED COMMODITIES: THE TROUBLE
WITH TRADE IN CHILDREN, BODY PARTS AND OTHER THINGS (1996); Calabresi
and Malamed, PropertyRules, Liability Rules, and Inalienability: One View of
the Cathedral,85 HARV. L. REv. 1089 (1972).
77 For a provocative argument that efficient outcomes are just, see RICHARD
POSNER, THE ECONOMICS OF JUSTICE, 13-115 (1981).
78 For examples of such exceptions, see, e.g., Zacchini, supra note 29 (use of
performer's complete act without permission actionable violation of property
right); International News Service v. Associated Press, 248 U.S. 215 (1918)
(taking of "hot news" an actionable misappropriation of property interest in
information).
79 The Supreme Court of the United States did reject a newsworthiness
rationale in Zacchini, but the subject matter was not the use of a "persona" but
rather of an entire videotaped performance.
80 This assumption is reinforced by the interpretation of the copyright clause
of the Constitution, requiring that property rights be limited to expression but
not to underlying facts and ideas. See, e.g., Baker v. Selden, 101 U.S. 99 (1879)
(ideas are not protectable but belong to everyone); Feist Publications, Inc. v.
Rural Telephone Service, 499 U.S. 340 (1991) (facts cannot be copyrighted
because they do not meet the constitutional requirement of originality).
81 See generally, Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, Information as Speech,
Information as Goods: Some Thoughts on Marketplaces and the Bill of Rights,
33 Digital
WM. &Commons@DePaul,
MARY L. REV. 665 2016
(1992). For a very interesting defense of a rich 29
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As a practical matter, even with a rich public domain, access to the
symbols and informational content of our society admittedly is
limited to some significant degree by wealth and social position.
The wealthier portion of the population, for example, may receive
a superior education or be exposed to a richer array of books, film
and other cultural artifacts. But this asymmetry is a problem for
speech and democratic theory, and not something we should
carelessly aggravate by frank commodification of large chunks of
the informational commons. Commodification would mean that
even after access to bits of information and to images and symbols
has legally been obtained, an additional price tag would be
attached to the right to use the information, thereby increasing the
wealth effect.
A third argument against commodification is that unavoidable
distortions in valuation will lead to unacceptable costs in the form
of lost uses. Although would-be users with assets to expend on
personal data might arrive at a fairly comfortable system of
determining when and how much to pay for a building block of
their own speech, the long-term social as well as personal costs of
such a system are undesirable.82 Sometimes a particular way in
which an information fragment is used will not demonstrate its full
significance (and worth) for decades. Unexpected circumstances
and serendipities change meaning over time. Also, one person's
use produces spillovers that benefit others in unexpected ways and
lead to new ideas or approaches, but the value of this benefit
cannot necessarily be captured by the original user. We can
predict, therefore, that commodifying information will lead to its
systematic under use. It is not unreasonable for a polity that holds
freedom of speech and its social benefits to be a preeminent good
to resolve doubts about the effect of markets in speech in favor of

common based on both economic and first amendment theory, see Benkler,
supra note 18.
82 Landes and Posner point out that returns that lie in the distant future are
deeply discounted and "have little effect on present decisions." Landes &
Posner, supra note 68, at 361-62. If this is correct, a user can be expected to
forego the use of licenses to use information if a sufficient payback cannot
reasonably be anticipated in the short run.
https://via.library.depaul.edu/jatip/vol10/iss2/5
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refusing to treat building blocks of expression as a form of private
wealth.
The preservation of a rich common has certainly correlated with
enormous national success in generating production of a vast array
of valuable and innovative information goods, as well as in
offering expansive opportunities for individual self-realization.
This correlation may be accidental, but I doubt it.
The
conservative approach, therefore, is one that does not lightly
tamper with the public domain. At the very least, anyone who
wants to argue in favor of greater commodification of its riches
ought to bear the burden of demonstrating a) that the property
claim at issue is consistent with the values of the First Amendment,
and b) that a market in information can operate with reasonable
accuracy. I would bet that the advocates of commodification -including those who argue that publicity rights are just a small and
self-evidently just incursion into the common -- will rarely be able
to meet these standards. But, unless they can, the public domain is
the perfect place to apply that old maxim, "If it ain't broke, don't
fix it." I think both the "Connecticut Yankee" and the civil
libertarian in Ralph's soul would resonate with that sentiment if he
were here to chime in.
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